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Abstract A simulation model is used to compare measures
for future management identified in the American lobster fishery
management pian; specifically, increases in the minimum legal
size and a modest reduction in aggregate fishing mortality are
evaluated. The analysis differs from previous work in that the
distributional aspects ofthe alternative management regulations
are quantified. The results indicate that (1) both an increased mini-
mum size and a reduction in fishing mortality are economically
justified in the sense that net benefits are positive; (2) increasing
the minimum size without an adjunct regulation to prohibit entry
will cause present fishermen to sufTcr an initial short-term re-
duction in revenues for which there will be no long-term gain;
(3) because increased minimum size can be justified on the basis
of consumer benefits alone, arguments favoring its increase to
prevent recruitment failure are moot as far as a test of national
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economic efficiency is concerned; and (4) a program of effort re-
duction which reduces by 20% the fraction of available lobsters
captured annually is projected to generate SI of producer benefits
for every pound of lobster landed. Reducing the annual harvest
fraction by 20% results in a level of fishery benefits greater than
increasing the minimum size to 89 mm (3^-in.), and increases
the coincidence of short-run costs and long-term benefits among
those impacted by fishery management.
Introduction
The past two decades of American lobster fishery management ex-
perience leads one to conclude that although efficiency benefits
have been the focus of most policy analyses of this fishery, very few
of the management regulations so far adopted embody the kinds
of policy prescriptions that emerge from economic efficiency anal-
ysis. Acheson (1975) has collected evidence which indicates that
many of the distributional consequences of management regula-
tions proposed for this fishery conflict strongly with the basic social
and cultural features of those within the fishery. Pontecorvo (1962)
attributed the past adoption of minimum size regulations not to
conservation but to intraindustry economic warfare. Other authors
(Hennessey. 1978) have described additional types of political, so-
cial, and legal constraints inherent in the management process
generally that work against management criteria based solely on
efficiency benefits. Zeckhauser (1981) argues that policymaker con-
cerns, quite appropriately, go beyond choosing those management
regulations that offer the greatest level of efficiency benefits; the
probability that a policy is adopted depends on who gains from it,
who loses, and by how much. Hence a strong argument can be
made that regulatory analysis which ignores distributional concerns
contains little of relevance to most management decisions.
Only two general management strategies exist for achieving the
management objectives established in the American lobster fishery
management plan (FMP). Either the minimum legal size governing
the harvest must be increased or fishing mortality must be reduced.
The alternatives are similar in biological effect in that each increases
average weight and the fraction of each age class which survives
to reproduce at least once. In their economic efficiency and distri-Benefits of American Lobster Management 355
butional consequences, however, these alternatives can differ sub-
stantially. A review of economic analyses eoneerning management
of this fishery reveals that the distributional consequences of alter-
native management regulations have received scant attention. In
particular, no analysis that we are aware of has quantified the net
benefits that lobster consumers are likely to obtain from the man-
agement alternatives outlined above.
In this article the economic and biological efTeets of the two
management alternatives are compared. This is done for three pos-
sible increases in the minimum legal size and a 20% reduction in
the fraction of available lobsters captured. First, we review recent
findings concerning the American lobster fishery. Second, we dis-
cuss a bioeconomic simulation model consistent with these findings
and then describe our results in detail. Finally, we summarize the
results and present some conclusions.
The U.S. American Lobster Fishery
The Ameriean lobster fishery competes annually with the scallop
fishery as the most valuable single-species fishery on the eastern
seaboard of the United States. The fishery set a string of annual
landings records in 1981. 1982. and 1983. with 1983 landings of
44.2 million pounds valued at $106.8 million by dockside buyers.
These recent landings records, possibly the product of factors such
as better catch reporting, small but favorable fluctuations in re-
cruitment success, or random changes in seawater temperature,
have drawn attention away from the problems of overcapitalization
and recruitment uncertainty which have characterized this fishery
for the better part of the past 20 years. During this time factors
exogeneous to the fishery caused the exvessel price of live American
lobsters to increase at a rate roughly 15% greater than the general
rate of price infiation (New England Fishery Management Council,
1983b, p. 57). and consequently, the manpower and other physical
resources employed in the fishery increased greatly. In many years
the strong demand for lobsters supported trapping effort increases
despite declining catch rates. Two decades of persistently increasing
lobster demand {and marginal improvements in harvesting effi-
ciency) have resulted in a fishery which now provides employment555 Edward J. Richardson and John M. Gates
for more than 12,(X)0 fishermen operating 10,000 vessels' and each
year captures as large a percentage of the legally available resource
base as any marine fishery in the United States.
The high rate of fishing mortality has caused two closely related
problems for fishery managers. One problem is that the intense
fishing pressure has resulted in a widespread low level of stock
fecundity. All recent biological research (New England Fishery
Management Council, I983a,b; Anthony and Caddy, 1980) indi-
cates that less than 10% of the inshore stock reaches maturity
before being captured. Although stock-dependent recruitment has
not been demonstrated, fishery managers fear that the number of
female lobsters that survive to reproduce is too small to ensure
replacement. A second problem is that the high mortality rates have
compressed the age structure in the American lobster resource to
the point where annual landings are now largely dependent on the
recruitment from a single year class. In many areas, this year class
is captured within a few months of attaining legal size. Given the
heavy dependence on each year class that enters the fishery, re-
cruitment failure in even one year would have major economic
impacts in all sectors of the fishery.
Most of the U.S. fishery for American lobsters occurs in waters
under state jurisdiction, and historically, each state has managed
its fishery in a unique and independent fashion. Although attempts
have been made to coordinate management practices among states
through informal agreements, these agreements have achieved only
limited success.-^ In 1983 the New England Fishery Management
Council (NEFMC) promulgated a national management plan for
the American lobster fishery which consisted of four conservation-
oriented management regulations and established as management
objectives (1) the reduction of overfishing and the probability of
recruitment failure, and (2) a minimization of the social and eco-
nomic impacts of fishery management. The cornerstone of the plan
is a regulation which extends the 81-mm (3-^-in.) minimum legal
size governing the state water fisheries to those lobsters taken with-
in the U.S. fishery conservation zone. The present plan does not
address the economic effects of present or higher levels of harvesting
sector overcapitalization, or the resource instability inherent in a
single-year-class fishery.Benefits of American Lobster Management -- 357
If it can be said that management policy for the American lobster
fishery has so far ignored economic efficiency objectives {and also
many eonservation objectives), it cannot be said to have resulted
from a lack of policy-oriented analyses. In a pioneering work. Bell
{1972) used catch and effort data from the Maine lobster fishery to
verify empirically many of the theoretical aspects of fishery devel-
opment in the absence of stock ownership rights. He estimated that
50% of the capital and labor employed in the fishery represented
an uneconomic use of these factors. Thomas (1973) also analyzed
catch and effort data and biological information from the Maine
fishery, and recommended that an 89-mm {34-in.) minimum size
be adopted to ensure that fishermen obtained the maximum sus-
tainable yield. Smith {1980) employed a more theoretically refined
model to update the Bell analysis, and estimated excess factor cost
at roughly 80%. Economic analyses of the Maine lobster fishery
have also been provided by Dow et al. {1975). who described gen-
erally the economic effects of management regulations that included
a trap tax to control effort, and the elimination of the common
property nature ofthe resource through the issuance of stock certi-
ficates to vessel owners, and by Acheson and Reidman (1982), who
employed economic and biological analyses to evaluate regulations
that increased minimum size. The latter authors calculated that
five annual 1.6-mm (rg"'"-) increases in the minimum legal size
would generate a 13% internal rate of return to harvesting, but
indicated that fishermen were ambivalent about the proposal be-
cause they feared that new entrants to the fishery would share in
or possibly dissipate fully any future returns to this management
strategy.
The policy literature concerning American lobster fishery man-
agement points out that substantial overcapitalization has existed
in the fishery for two decades and may be increasing under laissez-
faire management; that overcapitalization has caused fishery man-
agers to perceive a risk of recruitment failure in the fishery; and
that, while several alternative management strategies have been
proposed and their effects described generally, an absence of ana-
lytical detail has rarely permitted fishery managers to determine
completely "who wins, who loses, and by how much." In the next
section a model of the fishery is described which contains a level358 Edward J. Richardson and John M. Gates
of detail sufficient to allow progress in measuring the distributional
aspects of alternative management regulations for this fishery.
The Bioeconomic Simulation Model
Overview
Estimation of the effects of lobster management regulations and
the incidence of net benefits among resource users required the
development of a simulation model of the American lobster fishery.
The simulation model functions as a sophisticated accounting de-
vice, capable of tracking many interdependent fishery variables
simultaneously, and so allowing the biological and economic effects
of alternative management regulations to be determined. The model
specifies functional interdependencies between the resource stock
and the harvesting and marketing sectors of the fishery by linking
together three groups of mathematical equations describing (1) the
yield of the resource stock. (2) the costs of harvesting the resource,
and (3) price determination in the U.S. market for live American
lobsters (Figure 1). The model provides a deterministic analysis of
alternative management regulations by first generating estimates
of their net economic benefits and the distribution of these benefits
among resource harvesters and consumers at different points in
time, and then converting these time-varying estimates into an
equivalent perpetual annual flow (annuity).
To allow for the substantially different biologic and economic
parameters that characterize the inshore and offshore portions of
the fishery, a strategy was adopted whereby separate regional in-
shore and offshore fisheries could be simulated interdependently.
Because the majority of inshore landings are harvested within state
waters, most data have been collected and analyzed from a state-
specific perspective. However, a regional inshore fishery simulation
should be consistent with a weighted composite of all state com-
ponents. This required that each state fishery first be simulated in-
dependently using the available biologic and economic parameters
specific to it. Recruitment to each state fishery was determined by
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fishery to the best information available on these factors. Recruit-
ment to the regional inshore fishery was then set equal to the sum
of all state recruitment levels and the growth and mortality para-
meters entered as fishable-biomass weighted averages of the state-
specific parameter estimates. For simplicity it is assumed that an
81-mm(3i%-in.) minimum legal size governed the entire harvest in
1981.
The biological yield model (Figure 1) calculates the size and
composition of inshore and offshore yields for ranges of fishing
mortality {fleet size) and size at first capture. The model also cal-
culates the short-run changes in these yield characteristics due to
specific changes in the harvest regulations determining the level of
fishing mortality and the minimum legal size. For each combina-
tion of fishing mortality and size at first capture, this information
is passed to the economic model. The economic model determines
harvest cost, exvessel and wholesale prices, consumer and producer
surpluses, and the likely changes in these quantities due to changes
in the harvest regulations.^
A search procedure is employed to identify the economic surplus
values associated with initial equilibrium conditions and the fish-
ing mortality and minimum-size combinations commensurate with
the alternative management regulations to be evaluated. The time-
dependent surplus values identified in the search procedure are
converted to equivalent annual values using standard discounting
formulas. Benefit levels are interpolated between the initial ((Q) and
equilibrium [t y) surplus values associated with initial fishery con-
ditions and any particular regulatory change using a parabola that
intersects the surplus level at (Q ^"d has a stationary point at the
new equilibrium level of benefits.* Tbe interpolated disequilibrium
values are discounted and summed to obtain a present value. After
equilibrium is reached (f > tj), fishery surpluses are assumed to be
a uniform series whose present value is determined analytically.
Bioeconomics
The von Bertalanffy (1938) growth equation and a Beverton and
Holt (1957) cohort model are used to relate fishing mortality toBenefits of American Lobster Management 361
fishery yields. After the model is calibrated to initial fishery condi-
tions, yield changes resulting from increased minimum size are cal-
culated using the Hancoek (1975) version of the Gulland (1961)
method. Tbe biological model assumes (1) knife-edge selection, (2)
that all surviving lobsters removed from the fishable stock due to
an increased minimum size regulation gain 13% in carapace length
when they reenter the fishery, and (3) constant recruitment. The lack
of a stock-recruitment relationship simplifies the model but pre-
cludes the complete analysis of management regulations designed
to prevent recruitment failure. Fishery scientists have warned of
imminent stock collapse in this fishery for a century (Pontecorvo,
1962; Rutherford et al., 1967; Dewolf, 1974), and it has never hap-
pened. Scientists have formed subjective or prior density functions
concerning stock collapse and these priors have been nearly im-
pervious to objective data. Despite these beliefs, our analysis
examines the case where recruitment failure cannot occur, and
therefore produces lower-bound estimates of net benefits for har-
vest regulations if the objective probability of recruitment failure
is in fact diminished.
Two sets of economic relationships appear in the simulator. One
set is used in the structural model to relate harvesting costs to
fishing mortality and standardized effort measured in trap haul set
over days. A second set is employed in the economic model to relate
variations in the aggregate yield and average weight to exvessel
and wholesale prices. The primary function of the economic rela-
tionships is to determine the relative profitability of present or
potential effort levels. The structural model (Figure 1) cost equa-
tions describe fixed and variable fishing costs for five classes of
inshore vessels and the offshore fleet. Average fishing costs for each
vessel class are derived from Richardson (1982). State-specific
fishing costs were simulated by varying each state vessel class com-
position from that observed in Rhode Island in 1979 using infor-
mation gathered from regional vessel surveys and National Marine
Fisheries Service port agents. Total fishing costs include annual
operating expenses, a return to invested capital, and an opportunity
wage for the skipper and crew. The total cost function increases
linearly with fishing effort and the instantaneous fishing mortality
coefficient, but due to the diminishing relationship between the362 Edward J. Richardson and John M. Gates
instantaneous fishing mortality coefficient and the fraction of the
stock harvested annually, total costs are an increasing function of
the latter. Variations in inshore fishing mortality are achieved by
varying the size of all vessel classes proportionately.
The economic model uses the present value of social surplus
generated by the fishery over time as an indicator of total fishery
net benefits (Currie et al, 1971). The monthly exvessel and whole-
sale price equations contained in Appendix 1 of the American
lobster FMP Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) are used to
calculate social surplus. The demand equations contained in the
EIS are particularly useful because they incorporate the infiuence
of average weight in determining wholesale and exvessel price. In-
clusion of this quality effect is important both for correct price
prediction and for correct calculation of consumer surplus varia-
tions (Bradford and Hildenbrandt, 1977; Gates, 1974). A monthly
index of lobster landings generated from the data used to estimate
the price relationships (Wang and Kellogg, 1981) allows the annual
yield estimates produced by the biological model to be inputted
into the monthly price equations. The economic effects presented
in this analysis are calculated assuming that Canadian regulatory
policy, and hence the quantity and average size of live American
lobsters imported from Canada, remain unchanged during the time
period considered in the analysis.
Each open-access simulation assumes that increased fishing effort
will be produced if producer surplus exceeds a specified value. For
the inshore fishery a slightly negative value of producer surplus
($—1.4 million) was chosen to conform to the negative value of
producer surplus measured in a survey of Rhode Island license
holders {Richardson, 1982). This value was retained in both the
Rhode Island state and regional inshore simulations because it was
not possible to determine how much of the negative profits were
attributable to the presence of a worker satisfaction bonus (Ander-
son, 1980), the lack of profit motive among Rhode Island part-time
fishermen, or a transient disequilibriutn due to the O.K-mmlj^-in.)
increases in the minimum size promulgated for the Rhode Island
fishery in 1978 and 1979. However, the procedure used to calibrate
the simulation model to initial fishery conditions renders the results
insensitive to a wide range of initial equilibrium producer surplusBenefits of American Lobster Management 363
values. An equilibrium producer surplus value near zero was speci-
fied in all other simulations.
A listing of the biological, economic, and structural parameters
of the model, as well as the sources used to compile them, is con-
tained in Tables 1 and 2. A copy of the simulation program is
available from the authors upon request
Results
Increased Minimum Size
Increased minimum size was the management regulation whose
adoption appeared most likely when this research was initiated.
The minimum size regulation is an example of the "safe minimum
standards" approach advocated by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1968). is rela-
tively easy to implement, and enjoys wide support among fisher-
men. The inshore and offshore components of the fishery were
simulated under conditions of open-access entry and constant har-
vesting sector technical efficiency with the present 81-mm (3^-in.)
and three larger minimum sizes. The alternative minimum-size reg-
ulations considered are one-time increases of 1.6-, 3.2-, and 7.9-mm
(3^-, 3^-, and 3i-in. carapace lengths). The results are intended to
characterize the changes in harvesting sector profitability, fishing
intensity, and resource productivity that would follow after the
implementation ofthe minimum-size regulations.
The first group of parameters and results listed in Tables 3 and
4 illustrate how the per pound price and cost can be expected to
change after the larger minimum sizes are implemented. The results
indicate that if market structure remains stable, increasing the mini-
mum size will lead to a new equilibrium where real prices and
average harvesting costs in both fishery components are decreased.
For each size examined, price increases motivated by increased
average weight are outweighed by the price-depressing effects of
a larger yield (Gates, 1974). The 82.6-mm (3^ -in.) size is projected to
diminish exvessel price and average harvesting cost by 4.5%. The
89-mm (3|-in.) size reduces these variables by 14%. Harvesting
profitability remains unchanged because, where open-access entry
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to converge. In the inshore fishery harvesting costs and prices
equalize at a lower price because lobsters of increased average
weight are landed. In the offshore fishery the harvesting cost per
pound is reduced by the simultaneous effects of reduced fishing
effort and an increased minimum size (both increase resource
productivity).
The second group of parameters in Tables 3 and 4 tracks changes
in fishing intensity. The results indicate that as the fishery adjusts
to a larger minimum size, effort and fishing mortality increases will
occur inshore, while offshore these parameters will decrease. This
result is a consequence of the behavioral assumption that fishing
Table 3
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Table 4













Annual harvest fraction (%)
Equilibrium yields
Total yield (lb x 10^)
Average weight (lb)
















































































effort will increase if producer surplus exceeds a threshold value,
and will contract if price or resource productivity changes prohibit
the attaitiment of this value. It is important to note that if minimum
size is increased, it is highly unlikely that aggregate effort and fish-
ing mortality will remain unchanged. A bioeconomic analysis of
carapace-length regulations which assumes a fixed level of fishing
mortality is logically inconsistent unless effort changes are pre-
vented. After minimum size is increased, and the inshore fishery
begins to move toward a new equilibrium, lobsters of greater aver-
age weight are landed, increasing revenues sustain additional effort,
and ultimately, fishing mortality increases. As the offshore fishery36S Edward J. Richardson and John M. Gates
moves toward equilibrium, the average weight increases obtained
are only 20% of those inshore. The general price decreases caused
by the increased landing of the total fishery, combined with the
small gains in average productivity offshore, cause offshore exvessel
revenues, and hence fishing mortality, to decrease.
The last two groups of parameters in Tables 3 and 4 quantify
yield and mean weight changes. The results indicate that the short-
term negative yield increments which would accompany the alter-
native size regulations are larger than the respective long-run yields
that the regulations would generate. However, the former effects are
transitory while the latter are permanent. For the 1.6-mm size in-
crease the inshore landing projected for year 1 is 32 million pounds.
This level of landings is 14% lower than the status quo and is within
the range of 8 to 14% contained in the NEFMC EIS for this regu-
lation. A one-year average decrease of 9.9% is projected for the off-
shore fishery. For the size changes considered, year 1 average yield
decreases range from 5.2 million to 15.6 million pounds inshore and
from 0.6 million to 2.3 million pounds offshore. The relatively large
size of the temporary yield decreases is a direct result of the ex-
tremely high level of fishing pressure, and hence heavy dependence
on each entering year class. While projected short-term percentage
yield changes are roughly comparable for both fishery components,
projected changes in long-term yields are not. Inshore projected
mean weight increases are greater than those offshore. This differ-
ence in resource productivity and the general price decreases noted
above are the primary factors responsible for the contraction in
offshore fishing intensity which is projected to result from the im-
plementation of an increased minimum size.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the bioeconomic fishery equilibria
graphically for the 81-mm (3^-in.) and 82.6-mm (3^-in.) minimum
sizes. Considering the inshore results in Table I sequentially, the
increased minimum size first reduces the catch rate and the size
composition of the catch. Consumer demand begins to shift to the
right (larger intercept) due to the reduced fraction of small lobsters
in the catch (Figure 2). A temporary disequilibrium occurs, and the
fishery moves from point A to point B. At this point landings are
less than the initial equilibrium level. Yields begin to increase when
the fraction of lobsters proscribed from the fishery begins to reenterBenefits of American Lobster Management 369
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FIGURE 2. Bioeconomic relationships for the inshore fishery {X axis max = 60).
it. A new inshore equilibrium occurs at point C, where yield is in-
creased by 11.6%, mean weight has increased by 17.6%, and the
fraction of small lobsters in the catch is decreased by 6%. Figure 3
indicates that the implementation of an 82.6-mm (3i-in.) minimum
size will have few perceptible effects on the offshore fishery yield
function. Offshore yield is projected to remain stable at just over
6 million pounds, while mean weight increases just 4.2%.
Both yield functions indicate that at very low levels of fishing
mortality yields increase rapidly and reach a maximum at a rela-
tively low level of fishing mortality. This rapid peaking is due to
the low natural mortality rate believed to characterize the post-
recruitment phase of the population. The highly asymmetric na-
ture of the yield function indicates that yields arc less sensitive
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FIGURE 3. Bioeconomic relationships for the ofTshore fishery {X axis max = 15).
fishing mortality in the American lobster fishery is presently quite
high, one would expect that substantial effort reductions in this
fishery would cause relatively small quantity-induced variations
in consumer surplus. Both figures indicate that increasing the
minimum size will have a trivial effect on the yield function to the
left of its maximum.
Tables 5 and 6 contain the changes in consumer and producer
surplus that would occur if the present 81-mm (3^-in.) minimum
carapace length were increased to one of the alternatives evaluated.
Because constant recruitment is assumed, these changes are a re-
sult of harvesting slightly fewer lobsters of increased average weight
after the alternative regulation is implemented, and a new equi-
librium is reached (a trade-off between stock growth in weight and
natural mortality). Short-run decreases in both producer and con-
sumer surplus occur because the regulatory change temporarilyBenefits of American Lobster Management 371
Table 5
Current and Projected Consumers' Surplus for





































































shrinks the fishable stock, and thus the quantity of lobsters avail-
able for capture and consumption. The year 1 reductiotis iti con-
sumer surplus range from 16% ($2.9 million) for the 1.6-mm size
increase to 39% ($7.3 milhon) for tbe 7.9-mm increase.^ In absolute
dollar amounts the sbort-run decreases in producer surplus are
larger tban those for consumer surplus. Our projections range from
$6.3 million for the smallest size increase to $41 million for the
largest. The results obtained indicate tbat disequilibrium reductions
in producer benefits are concave with respect to increased minimum
size, witb proportional increases in tbe latter eausing more tban
proportional decreases in the former.
Equilibrium benefit gains for consumers range from 21% for tbe
smallest size increase to 68% for the largest. Tbese equilibrium gains
in consumer benefits are tbe result of a larger quantity of
higher-quality (larger) lobsters being available for consumption.
The pattern of projected increases suggests that gains to consumers372 Edward J. Richardson and John M. Gates
Table 6
Current and Projected Producers' Surplus for


































































are concave with respect to increases in the minimum legal size.
Equilibrium producer benefits are projeeted to change very little.
In the long run, increasing tbe minimum size in an open-access
fishery results in a fishery witb a larger number of fishermen eaeb
no better off economically than under tbe smaller minimum-size
regulation (Turvey, 1964). Long-run surplus will converge on a
minimum level acceptable to fisbermen regardless of tbe minimum
size governing tbe harvest.
The surplus values presented so far are undiscounted, that is,
they are not directly comparable unless the opportunity cost of
capital (interest rate) is zero. To permit a direct comparison of the
dollar values of the various benefit fiows witb more realistic interest
rates, the equivalent annualized values in Table 7 were calculated.
The equivalent annualized values are scalar transforms of present
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generates increased economic benefits from the fishery, and that
the largest minimum size increase results in the largest gain in
fishery benefits. At a real annual rate of interest of 15%, a one-time
increase in the minimum size to 89-mm (3i-in.) confers a 14%
increase in annualized benefits. Using a 6% interest rate, the
regulation increases annual fishery benefits by 52%. The social
benefits obtained from the alternative minimum sizes exhibit
diminishing returns, and this effect is more pronounced when
interest rates are large. The fraction of benefits realized through
the 3.2-mm increase (40% of the largest increase) ranges from 76%
to 122% of the benefits obtained from the largest increase. It
is noteworthy that the benefits of increased minimum size are
incident entirely on consumers. Initial revenue deferrals impose a
cost on current fishermen which, due to the open-access entry
conditions, is not compensated by longer-term gains. In the fol-
lowing section the potential gains from a policy of controlled ex-
ploitation are presented.
Reduced Fishing Mortality
The American lobster FMP identifies limitations on entry, total
catch, and the number of traps as possible alternatives for control-
ling fishing mortality. Analyses of the social and economic effects
of alternative approaches to the regulation of fishing effort (Bed-
dington and Rettig, 1984; Crutchfield, 1979; Moloney and Pearse,
1979) have established that some form of resource allocation via
transferable use rights is the strategy most likely lo enhance incen-
tives for increasing economic efiliciency. Table 8 contains estimates
of the net benefits for consumers and fishermen of any effort reduc-
tion scheme that reduces by 20% the fraction of available lobsters
captured annually i\ ~ e'^) without altering harvesting sector
technical efficiency.*^ The 20% figure was chosen arbitrarily. The
reduction needed to maximize social surplus may be triple this per-
centage. Considering model precision and issues of political econ-
omy, there is little value in simulating such a draconian policy.
Table 8 indicates that to achieve a level of fishing mortality com-
mensurate with a 20% reduction in the annual harvest fraction of
both fishery components, inshore effort must be reduced by 43%Benefits of American Lobster Management 375
Table 8
Simulation Results for Reduced Fishing Mortality Equilibria
Parameter








Annual harvest fraction (%)
Equilibrium yields
Total yield (lb x 10^)
Average weight (ib)





















































and ofTshore effort must be reduced 37%. Once fishing mortality
is reduced and the stock age structure reequilibrates, fishery wide
total yield is projected to increase 9% and mean weight is projected
to increase 12%. Profitability in the new equilibrium is determined
by the opposing influences on price of increased yield and increased
average weight. A comparison of the results in Table 8 with those
in Tables 3 and 4 indicates that productivity (mean weight) in-
creases due to increased minimum size are greatest inshore, but
productivity increases due to reduced fishing mortality are great-
est offshore. Since technical efficiency is held constant, the cost of376 Edward J. Richardson and John M. Gates
fishing mortality does not change. Under these conditions our pro-
jected changes in harvesting sector profitability result solely from
cbanges in resource productivity.
Table 9 contains the consumer and producer surplus levels pro-
jected to accompany the reduction in fishing mortality. As with
increased minimum size, consumer and producer benefits are tem-
porarily decreased because fewer lobsters are landed in the short
run. In the long run both consumer and producer benefits are
projected to increase because in the new equilibrium resource pro-
ductivity improves. Lower prices and increased mean weight cause
the equilibrium consumer surplus to increase 15% ($2.5 million).
With fishing effort regulated, exvessel price and average harvesting
Table 9
Surpluses and Changes in Surpluses Projected with Reduced
Fishing Mortality in the American Lobster Fishery
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costs no longer converge. Equilibrium producer benefits increase
from a value near zero to $46.6 million. The 20% reduction in the
fraction of available lobsters harvested annually is projected to gen-
erate, annually, $1 of producer benefits for every pound of lobster
landed.
Equivalent annual dollar values for the surplus flows generated
after the harvest fraction is reduced are listed in Table 7. The re-
sults suggest that the net social benefit increases generated with
this management regulation are 5- to 15-foId greater than those
which would be obtained if the largest increase in the minimum
size were implemented. Projected benefit increases range from $38.2
million to $45.7 million depending on the discount rate used to
compare the benefit flows. When the harvest fraction is reduced
through controlled fishing effort the distribution of net benefits
differs from that obtained when minimum legal size is increased.
Although reducing the harvest fraction by 20% provides consumer
benefits only roughly equal to those obtained with the smallest
minimum size increase, producer benefit increases are not dissipated
by new entrants, and rise to levels substantially greater (approxi-
mately $47 million) than zero. Thus, reducing the harvest fraction
via effort regulation strongly benefits those producers remaining in
the fishery while weakly benefiting consumers.
Summary and Conclusions
Total net benefits of size and efl'ort regulations and their distribu-
tion between consumers and fishermen were estimated for the
American lobster fishery. Assuming costless implementation of
alternative regulations, the results indicate (1) that both types of
regulation are efficient in the sense that net benefits are positive;
(2) that consumer benefits are sufficient, on economic efliciency
grounds, to justify increased minimum size; and (3) that controUing
fishing effort is the management strategy with the greatest potential
for increased economic efficiency. The results also suggest that con-
trolling fishing effort via transferable use rights results in a greater
coincidence of short-run costs and long-term benefits among those
impacted by fishery management, and that future benefits projected
to accompany such a program of controlled fishing mortality are378 Edward J. Richardson and John M. Gates
sufficient to compensate fishermen for the short-run costs of this
measure.
Tbe results of the analysis permit several conclusions. However,
we must qualify them because in all cases the lobster market re-
sponse to changes in average weight determines to a great extent
the net benefits of each regulation, and the complete structure of
the U.S. market for live lobsters is not known. The model price
equations provide for increased price due to increased average
weight, but the parameters are point estimates, and a point may
exist where this effect diminishes or even reverses. We do note that,
in each case examined, the minimum size increase results in lob-
sters of average weight within the range (1 to 2 Ib) of the data used
in estimating the price equations.
The first conclusion drawn is that minimum size increases are
more efficient than the status quo. This conclusion does not rest
on the prevention of recruitment failure. If one believes that this
regulation is required to prevent recruitment failure, the conclusion
is reinforced. A second conclusion is that increased minimum size
wiil cause current fishermen to suffer an initial sbort-term loss for
whicb there will be no long-term gain. Only by controlling fishing
effort can fishery managers generate compensatory long-run benefits
for current lobster fishermen. However, we qualify tbis conclusion
because if recruitment failure is imminent, an initial loss of revenues
will occur whether or not minimum size is increased^.
A third conclusion follows from the foregoing qualification. Since
increased minimum size is justifiable on tbe basis of consumer
benefits alone, the question of recruitment failure is moot as far as
a test of increased economic efficiency is concerned. However, we
have seen that lobstermen stand to lose by the proposal if recruit-
ment is unaffected by fishing mortality. If lobstermen are to be
persuaded to favor tbe proposal, it would seem tbat either anal-
yses that address stoek recruitment in a probabilistic manner (Getz
and Swartzman. 1981) need be applied to the American lobster
fishery, or an acceptable method for controlling fishing effort must
be devised as an adjunct to increased minimum size. Our analysis
of increased minimum size also points out the economic interde-
pendency between tbe inshore and offshore components of the
fishery. While each component is acclimated to a different environ-Benefits of American Lobster Management 379
ment of resource productivity and harvesting economics, the re-
turns to both fisheries are still determined in the same market.
Our analysis of controlled fishing mortality indicates that this
measure generates by far the largest quantity of net economic
benefits. To the extent that social or economic conditions require
fishery managers to value fishery participation per se, the measure
results in reduced opportunities for participation (approximately
40%) that are not evaluated in the analysis. A second conclusion
concerning controlled fishing mortality is that it is complementary
to increased minimum size. Opponents of economic efficiency often
overlook the conservation effects of controlling fishing mortality.
By stabilizing or reducing fishing mortality, fishery managers can
avoid many of the social costs of stock replenishment measures
such as increased minimum size. In this way the assignment of
limited-use rights could narrow the divergence between social and
private net benefits. A management strategy that integrates mini-
mum-size regulations and some sort of limited-use policy could
be advantageous to lobstermen, consumers, and fishery managers
alike. This is true because, in the absence of controls on fishing
mortality, increased minimum size can induce increased fishing
effort, and high levels of fishing effort exacerbate the costs of fishery
management. With present fishing mortality very high in the lob-
ster fishery, the marginal productivity of additional effort is close
to zero. Since maturity ogives indicate that moderate increases in
the minimum size will result in maturation gains of only a few
percent (New England Fishery Management Council, 1983b, pp.
23-24), the additional inshore fishing effort induced by increased
minimum size could nullify any gains in stock fecundity. Under
these conditions, increasing the minimum size without a comple-
mentary measure to control fishing mortality would be suboptimal
in terms of economic benefits, stock reproductive security, and
stabilized fishing mortality.
At this time there appears to be little consensus among fisher-
men or fishery managers about the urgency of finding solutions to
the overcapitalization and recruitment uncertainty that character-
ize the American lobster fishery. The harvest regulations contained
in the present American lobster FMP do little but codify the fac-
tors responsible for these problems. Although enough is currently380 Edward J. Richardson and John M. Gates
known about the biology and economics of the fishery to describe
the consequences of alternative management regulations, there is
no consensus on which, if any, to adopt. Unless management re-
gulations are supported by fishermen, compliance may be poor,
resentment may be high, and the potential biological and economic
benefits of new regulations may be dissipated by higher social
costs of enforcement and avoidance of regulations. •
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Notes
1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the United States,
NOAA/NMFS, Washington, D.C, 1983.
2. Since 1972 the lobster-producing states of Maine through North
Carolina and the National Marine Fisheries Service have cooperated
under the auspices of the NMFS State/Federal Fishery Management
Program.
3. Typically, one finds a range of values for fishing mortality (F) and
age at exploitation (/J for which the economic gains from increasing t^.
vary directly with f, but the elapsed time until they are fully realized
varies inversely with F.
4. B, =
where B, is the benefit level at time (, BQ and B^- are net benefit levels,
and T is the time interval between initial and subsequent equilibria.
5. Using the consumers' surplus associated with domestic catch as a
base; using total consumers' surplus (including imports), these percentage
decreases would be less.
6. An anonymous reviewer notes that should regulating fishing mor-
tality produce a seasonal pattern of landings different from that used to
describe the initial fishery equilibrium, our revenue projections would be
incorrect. We acknowledge this fact but can see no advantage in arbi-
trarily specifying an alternative pattern contingent on an as yet unspec-
ified program of fishing mortality reduction.Benefits of American Lobster Management 381
1. Since the model does not admit recruitment failure, it may by yielding
an overly pessimistic portrayal of the benefits to current fishermen of
increased minimum size. It is conjectured, however, that this fact does
nol change the conclusion greatly because producers' surplus tends to-
ward a minimum acceptable level in an open-access fishery.
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